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THE N.L.R.B.'S DUES REIMBURSEMENT REMEDY IN
PERSPECTIVE*
ARTHUR M. SCHILLER**
IMNRODUCTION

Where employees have been coerced to pay union dues, initiation
fees, assessments, permit fees, referral fees, "dobies" and the like,
an inequitable situation exists requiring that restitution be made by
the parties whom the National Labor Relations Board determines
to be legally responsible for having required that the payments be
made. In an effort to restore the status quo in the particular situation and to deter others from entering into contracts and practices,

which, in general, encourage membership in a labor organization,
the Board has ordered a disgorgement remedy. An enunciation of
the Board's power to fashion this remedial order was issued by the
Supreme Court in Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB 1 in which
the Court affirmed the specific dues reimbursement order as being
within the scope of the statutory language which vested in the Board
the power "to take such affirmative action ...
policies of this Act."2

as will effectuate the

The typical situations in which the Board found disgorgement
to be an appropriate remedy involved employer domination or assistance in violation of section 8 (a) (2) of the NLRA.3 Such was
the case in Virginia Electric, where the Board found the dues checkoff arrangement illegal because made in favor of an employer dominated union. Four years after that decision the Taft-Hartley
amendments were enacted which made unlawful all closed-shop
contracts, and accordingly, the Board no longer had to depend upon
a finding of an 8 (a) (2) violation preliminary to ordering the reimbursement of unlawfully exacted dues and fees. 4 The rationale
flowing from the amendments appeared to have tied in with the
conclusion that employees were coerced in the payment of dues, fees
* This article reflects the opinions of the author, and does not purport to
reflect the official position of the National Labor Relations Board, with which
the author is presently connected, or necessarily the opinions of any members
of the Board.
** A.B., LL.B., University of Illinois; LL.M., Georgetown University.
1. 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
2. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(c), 49 Stat.
1921 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958).
3. Charles W. Carter Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 251 (1956); The Englander Co., 114
N.L.R.B. 1034 (1955); The Item Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 67 (1955); Hibbard Dowel
Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 28 (1955).
4. Marlin Rockwell Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 553 (1955); The Eclipse Lumber
Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 464 (1951).
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and assessments in situations where compulsory unionism was
present, or where fees and assessments in excess of periodic dues
were exacted.
Finally, in Brown-Olds5 the Board took the position that since
Taft-Hartley declared closed shops to be contrary to public policy,
the dues 6 required and collected under a closed shop contract (and
all assessments under any contract) were coercively obtained, since
such payments constituted the price the employees had to pay to
retain their jobs. The Brown-Olds case was a significant first in two
major respects: First, the basis for disgorgement was stated to be
the existence and enforcement of a contract found to be illegal because it provided for a type of union-security which exceeded the
limits expressed in the proviso to section 8 (a) (3). Second, the Board
ordered that dues be reimbursed to al the employees at the BrownOlds Company. Prior to Brown-OZds, the only cases in which the
remedy ran to the benefit of all the employees were those involving
both an employer dominated, supported or "foisted" union and some
form of compulsory unionism. 7 Where no union-security or closedshop contracts were in effect, the remedy was limited to those situations where coercion was affirmatively established and directed only
in favor of those employees who were specifically named. Thus,
Brown-Olds may be taken for the proposition that, where dues are
collected under a contract which is illegal because it contains a
union-security provision exceeding the permissible limits set by TaftHartley, the mere existence of such illegal provision will be sufficient
evidence of coercion to warrant the disgorgement of all monies
collected pursuant thereto, to all employees covered thereby.8 How5. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing and Pipefitting
Indus., Local 231 (the Brown-Olds case), 115 N.L.R.B. 594 (1956).
6. The Board failed to order reimbursement of initiation fees presumably
because such fees were collected 'more than six months prior to the filing
of the charge with the Board .... ." Labor Management Relations Act (TaftHartley Act) § 10(b), 49 Stat. 1921 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1958). But
cf. American Dredging Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 139 (1959), modified, 45 L.R.R.M.
2405 (3d Cir. 1960), where the court denied the Board's Brown-Olds remedy
noting that although section 10(b) limited the respondent's liability, the
Board's remedial order would have required the respondent to reimburse
initiation fees which were paid more than six months prior to the filing and
service of the charge.
7.Virginia Elec. & Power Co., v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943); NLRB v.
Parker Bros. & Co., 209 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Baltimore Transit
Co., 140 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1944); Hibbard Dowel Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 28 (1955).
Cf. NLRB v. Shedd-Brown Mfg. Co., 213 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1954); NLRB v.
Braswell Motor Freight, 209 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1954).
8. Some question may be raised as to the soundness of the last clause. If
the coercion to pay dues arises from the mere existence of an illegal contract,
then eradication of its unlawful effects should involve reimbursement to all
employees covered by the contract, and not be confined merely to the
benefit of those who were specifically shown to have been coerced at a

particular job location. In Brown-Olds the Board issued a broad cease and

desist order requiring the union to cease giving effect to its contract with

1961]

N.L.R.B. DUES REIMBURSEMENT REMEDY

ever, the cases decided subsequent to Brown-Olds, up to but not
including those decided in 1958, do not consistently appear to bear out
this proposition. Yet, some basic ground rules are established and
analysis will be enhanced if the cases intervening between BrownOlds and 1958 are explored.
In one case 9 the Board found that the employer had violated section 8 (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the act by executing a contract containing
a union-security provision with a union which was not the majority
representative of the employees concerned. Apparently following
Brown-OZds, the Board ordered the full disgorgement of all dues
deducted and all initiation fees and assessments paid by the employees, although no reference to Brown-OZds was made anywhere in
the intermediate report or Board decision. Overlaying this case, however, are numerous decisions which either limited' 0 or totally denied the application of Brown-Olds in situations where the broad
order appeared to be warranted.
Toward the end of 1957 several decisions appeared which again
seemed to indicate Board approval and continued application of the
unique remedy. In Broderick Wood Products, 12 the Board adopted

the trial examiner's conclusion that the coercive element in a contract
is the union shop clause which requires membership in the union
as the price of employment, and that its mere existence inevitably
coerces the payment of initiation fees and dues. The order required
the employer and union, jointly and severally, to refund all fees and
the Brown-Olds Company and any other employers with whom the union
maintained the unlawful agreement. The reimbursement order was limited,
however, to the employees at the Brown-Olds Company. The ramifications
resulting from a failure to apply Brown-Olds in line with the logic of
the rationale, which would seemingly require consistent treatment, will be
discussed more fully, infra.
9. United Elec. Workers, Local 430 (the Mohawk Business Machines case),
116 N.L.R.B. 248 (1956).
10. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 1400 (the Pardee Constr. Co. case),
115 N.L.R.B. 126 (1956); United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 983 (the 0. W.
Burke Co. case), 115 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1956). In these cases the Board limited
its reimbursement order to the permit fees exacted and to the employees
who were shown to have been discriminated against. In neither case was
the union-security provision attacked; the violations were founded upon
the illegal arrangements or illegal enforcement of the contracts.
11. In International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 470 (the McCloskey & Co.
case), i116 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1956), the Board found an illegal union-security
provision which was actually enforced. A year later, in The Marley Co.,
117 N.L.R.B. 107 (1957), the Board said: "[Tihe Board, with court approval,
has consistently held that maintenance of an unlawful contract, apart from
its enforcement is violative of the Act." Id. at 110. The Board then went on
to find that the closed shop contract in fact was enforced, yet its order
failed to provide for any disgorgement whatsoever. See also Triboro
Carting Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 775 (1957), in which the Board found enforcement of the illegal union-security clause and cited Brown-Olds as the
controlling precedent for its broad cease and desist order but again failed to
provide for any reimbursement.
12. 118 N.L.R.B. 38 (1957), ajfd, 261 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1958).
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dues paid by the employees under the unlawful agreements. Subsequently, the Board appeared to narrow the operative scope of the
remedy in Bryan Manufacturing Co.,13 where the Board found the
union-security clause unlawful and, without referring to Brown-Olds
or Broderick, ordered the respondents to refund to all the employees
the dues and fees actually checked off. 14
One further decision deserves mention in this context even though
no union-security issue was involved. In Unit Parts Co., 5s the union,
which was the majority representative of the employees, refused
to sign the bargaining agreement unless 80 per cent of the employees
joined the union and signed dues check-off authorizations. The Board
held that the union violated section 8(b) (1) (A) of the act and
ordered it to refund to all employees all dues and monies collected
pursuant to the authorization. The Board, citing Brown-Olds said:
[W]e do not believe that additional evidence of coercion is necessary
to warrant an order directing the Respondent to relinquish the fruits of
its unfair labor practices. It is sufficient that the Respondent unlawfully exacted membership and dues check-offs as the price the employees
in question had to pay to entitle them to the benefits of the contract.16
It would seem that, based upon the language employed by the trial
examiner in Broderick which expressly negatived the check-off
proposition as bearing on the question of coercion, the language
relating to dues check-off in the above extract could be deleted
without affecting the underlying rationale in the least. If we are to
take Broderick at its word, the reimbursement order here would appear to have been warranted, with or without check-off authorizations, since the dues and fees were collected under a contractual
provision which illegally required membership as a condition of

employment.
It appears that the thread which unites these cases into a cohesive
whole is not the domination of, or assistance rendered to, a union, or
the existence of an unlawful union-security agreement standing alone
13. 119 N.L.R.B. 502 (1957), enforced sub nom. Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1959), reversed, 362 U.S. 411
(1960). In view of the Supreme Court's reversal of the Board on other
grounds, it was unnecessary for the Court to reach the remedial issue.
14. Whether this was in fact a limitation on Brown-Olds is not entirely
free from doubt. It may very well be that in Bryan none of the employees
involved performed their dues-paying obligations to the respondent union
in any manner other than by means of the check-off provisions. If this
were the case in fact, then the order in Bryan would appear to have been
equally as broad as those directed in Brown-Olds and Broderick. Cf. Paul
M. O'Neill Int'l Detective Agency, 124 N.L.R.B. 167 (1959); Masters-Lake
Success, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 580 (1959).
15. General Drivers, Local 886 (the Unit Parts Co. case), 119 N.L.R.B. 222
(1957), enforced, 264 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1959).
16. 119 N.L.R.B. at 223. (Emphasis added.)
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or as implemented by dues check-off authorizations, but rather the
coercive effects which these illegal factors prompt and maintain. Thus,
the commission of an unfair labor practice will warrant the imposition of a reimbursement remedy if such commission prompts the
illegal flow of dues and fees payments.
REMEDY
Cases Involving Section 8 (a)(2): Dominationand Assistance
Before proceeding with the recent decisions, it might be advisable
RECENT DECISIONS INVOLVING A DISGORGEVIENT

to refer once again to the Virginia Electric case where the Supreme
Court was presented with an employer-domination situation which
squarely raised the question of the Board's power to order a reim-

bursement remedy. The Court, rejecting the respondent employer's
contention that Congress did not envision a reimbursement remedy
when it enacted Section 10 (c), held that the appropriateness of a
particular remedy is "for the Board to decide according to its reasoned
judgment."' 7 The Court went on to say that unless "it can be shown
that the [Board's] order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other
than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the
Act,"' 8 the courts will not disturb the Board's remedial orders. 19
Thus, it would appear that the question of whether a reimbursement
order is a permissible means for effectuating the policies of the act
20
has been affirmatively settled.
17. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 544 (1943).
18. 319 U.S. at 540.
19. This proposition has since been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
20. However, it should be noted that a distinction in terminology should

be drawn between a reimbursement remedy qua remedy and the more
popular label of a Brown-Olds remedy. The Supreme Court upheld the
application of a reimbursement remedy in an 8(a) (2) employer-domination
case. In the Brown-Olds case, the Board applied a reimbursement remedy in
a situation wherein no elements of 8(a) (2) domination, assistance or foisting existed. The rationale underlying the coercion upon which a remedial
order rests is obviously more compelling in the 8(a) (2) case than in an
8(a) (3) type case, for in the former the union cannot really raise any
claim or color of right to receive the payments of dues and fees since it
does not possess the status of a bargaining representative freely chosen by
a majority of the employees. In an 8(a) (3) case, however, where the union
clearly is entitled to such status, it is a much more refined and often elusive
type of dialectic which concludes that the employees were coerced to pay
dues and fees. This is so because the essence of the 8(a) (3) violation is
not coercion, but solely discriminationwhich encourages or discourages union
membership. While it is arguable that every violation of sections 8(a) (2),
(3), (4) and (5) will also involve "interference, restraint, or coercion"
within the meaning of 8(a) (1), it is questionable whether the extension of
the "coercion" in 8(a)(1) is proper where the heart of the violation rests
within the framework of section 8 (a) (3). The Supreme Court has approved
the extension in an 8(a) (2) context in the Virginia Electric case; it has not
yet done so where the violation involves union shop or hiring hall infirmities.
Accordingly, until (and unless) the Supreme Court affirms the application of a disgorgement remedy in an 8(a) (3) context, the term "Brown-
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Of the many Board decisions issued in 1958, (dealing with violations of section 8(a) (2) of the act) the domination cases were conspicuous by their complete absence from the scene. All violations
of this section dealt with unlawful assistance, the majority of
which were predicated upon the finding that the employer executed
a contract containing union-security provisions with a union which,
at the time, was not the majority representative of the employees
concerned.
In Illinois Malleable Iron Co., 21 the employer extended a contract
containing union-security provisions to a union which was not the
chosen representative of the employees and required that dues
check-off authorizations be signed as a condition of employment. The
Board order required the respondent employer to refund to any
employees or former employees dues or other monies which were
deducted from their wages.
In Gibbs Corp.,22 the contract contained seniority provisions which
the Board found (without discussing the point) violated 8 (a) (2) in
that, although the settlement of controversies relating to seniority
was delegated to a joint employer-union board, the union was assured
of majority membership.3 The Board did not order the employer
to cease recognizing the union,24 nor did it require any reimbursement.
In Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp.2 the Board found that the employer
Olds" remedy should be reserved for 8(a) (3) cases and the general term
"reimbursement" remedy, for cases involving 8(a) (2) violations. In this
regard, it may be significant that the Supreme Court, while granting certiorari in two cases which involve 8(a) (3) aspects and appropriately may be
deemed to be Brown-Olds problems (NLRB v. Local 60, United Bhd. of
Carpenters, and Local 357 Teamsters, both infra, Appendix II), recently denied a petition for certiorari in NLRB v. Revere Metal Art Co., infra, Appendix 11, an 8(a) (2) assistance case which appears to rest upon the
traditional VirginiaElectric principle.
21. 120 N.L.R.B. 451 (1958).
22. 120 N.L.R.B. 1079 (1958).
23. Incidentally, the Board cited Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 837 (1954), enforced as maodified sub nom. NLRB v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 225 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1955) for its finding of illegality.
It is this identical delegation of "unfettered control" which theoretically
underlies the Board's decision in Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated
General Contractors, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957), enforcement denied, 270
F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959). See, e.g., Local 425, United Ass'n of Journeymen
and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Indus. (the Lummus Corp.
case), 125 N.L.R.B. 1161 (1959).
24. Apparently the Board was adhering to its policy of not ordering the
employer to cease recognizing the union in an industry where employment
relationships are relatively unstable and in consequence of which representation elections could not be held. Cf. Edward A. Daylor Co., 123 N.L.R.B.
1692 (1959). Although generally reserved for the building and construction
industry, the Board applied it here to the maritime industry. But see
Houston Maritime Ass'n, 121 N.L.R.B. 389 (1958); Galveston Maritime Ass'n,
122 N.L.R.B. 692 (1958).
25. 120 N.L.R.B. 1135 (1958).
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had rendered illegal assistance to an independent union by entering
into a collective bargaining agreement at a time when a question
concerning representation was pending before the Board.26 But,
since there is no evidence that the contract contained union-security
or closed shop provisions, no particular emphasis need be given to the
fact that the Board failed to order any dues reimbursement.
All of the remaining assistance cases provided for reimbursement
in one degree or another. Thus, in Coast Aluminum Co.,27 the employer was ordered to reimburse the initiation fees and dues deducted from the employees wages and paid to, or being retained
for, the union. The employer unlawfully assisted the union by
executing a contract containing union-security provisions at a time
when the union was not the bona fide representative of the employees. The Board noted that although the complaint did not allege
that the dues were collected under unlawful check-off authorizations,
2
such finding would be unnecessary to warrant the refund order. 8
On essentially the same set of facts however, the Board, in Dixie
Bedding Manufacturing Co.,29 while relying principally upon the
coercive effects of the illegal union-security clause, incorporated
language in its opinion which seemed to intimate that the presence
of the check-off provision in the contract was a coercive element
in itself.3 0 Whatever force the Board seemed to give to the check-off
provision there, two cases decided subsequently dispel all doubt in
that they establish that check-off provisions are not integrally linked
with a disgorgement order.3 1
26. Cf. A. 0. Smith Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 321 (1958).

27. 120 N.L.R.B. 1326 (1958).
28. A. 0. Smith Corp., supra note 26, in which case the Board cites BrownOlds for the remedial order.
29. 121 N.L.R.B. 189 (1958).
30. Note that this proposition appears to be contrary to the rationale
adopted in Broderick Wood Prods., supra note 12. Note also that Board
Member Jenkins registered a dissent in the case, indicating that he would
reserve the reimbursement remedy for a more flagrant violation, having found
no elements of coercion present. The majority of the Board stated: "[W]e

cannot conceive of a more wilful or flagrant example of a violation than

the one herein." 121 N.L.R.B. at 197. See also Revere Metal Art Co., 123
N.L.R.B. 114, 116 (1959) where the Board's order directed the respondents,
jointly and severally, to "reimburse its [the Company's] employees for any
initiation fees, dues, or other moneys . . . checked off as a condition of
employment .... ." (Emphasis added.)
31. Lakeland Bus Lines, 122 N.L.R.B. 281 (1958); A. 0. Smith Corp., supra
note 26. In the latter case, the Board adopted the trial examiner's conclusion, inter alia, that check-off was not the coercive element (citing
Broderick). In both cases the Board cited, inter alia, Brown-Olds as the
controlling precedent for the remedial portion of the order. See in particular Grand Union Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 589 (1958), where the trial examiner
recommended the reimbursement of all dues checked off. The facts disclosed
that all of the employees involved had authorized collection in this manner.
(Cf. supra note 14.) The Board adopted the trial examiner's recommendation, but extended it to include any other moneys unlawfully exacted under
such agreement. See also Adley Express Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1372 (1959). Cf.
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In August of 1958, the Board issued its decision in Houston Maritime Association,32 in which the employer was held to have violated
section 8 (a) (1), (2) and (3), and the union, sections 8(b) (1) (A)
and (2), of the act, by the execution and maintenance of a contract
which failed to comply with the criteria set forth in the Mountain
Pacific decision. 33 In addition, the contract required that, as a condition of employment, the employees pay a percentage of their
wages to the union for the hiring hall services it performed. The
respondents were ordered, jointly and severally, to reimburse the
employees who were required to pay the union a percentage, but
no mention was made of any refund of initiation fees and/or dues.
In December 1958, the Board, in a situation involving substantially
identical facts, ordered the respondents to reimburse all present and
former employees "who have unlawfully been required to pay a
percentage of their wages, initiation fees, dues and other moneys to
the Respondent [union] . ...
34 In distinguishing the remedial
provisions in Houston, the Board said:
We note that in the Houston Maritime Association case .

.

. the Board

did not direct the refund of any moneys paid as the price for employment other than percentages collected, although illegal practices similar
to those in the instant case were involved. However, at the time the
Houston case was decided, the Board was still in the process of reexamining the Brown-Olds principle, which it did not reaffirm until
after the Houston decision issued.35
Thus the Board has perhaps accounted for all of the cases decided
prior to Galveston, where Brown-Olds was limited or not applied at

allM6
Local 269, International Bhd. of Teamsters (the A. Custen, Inc. case), 122
N.L.R.B. 1242 (1959).
32. 121 N.L.R.B. 389 (1958), enforced, 268 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1959).
33. Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated General Contractors, Inc.,
119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957), enforcement denied, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959). In
this decision, the Board set forth three safeguards which all agreements for
an exclusive hiring hall must incorporate if the contract is to be immune
from condemnation. In effect, the union, which operates as an employment
agency, is to agree (1) to refer applicants for employment in a nondiscriminatory manner; (2) to permit the employer to exercise the right to
reject any of the applicants so referred; and (3) that the agreement, and
the pertinent provisions relating to the hiring system, are to be posted in
conspicuous places (where notices to employees are customarily posted).
Great numbers of cases are presently including a Brown-Olds remedy where
the contractual infirmity is a failure to incorporate the three safeguards
required by this decision. Yet, the Mountain Pacific decision itself failed
to provide for a Brown-Olds remedy.
34. Galveston Maritime Ass'n, 122 N.L.R.B. 692, 705 (1958).
35. 122 N.L.R.B. at 699 n. 18.
36. See also Grand Union Co., supra note 31, where the trial examiner
recommended Brown-Olds despite the existence of numerous decisions in
which such remedy was not applied, distinguishing these cases on the
conclusion that the Board was "going along" with the General Counsel's
recommended reprieve. (This reprieve refers to the General Counsel's
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The significance of Brown-Olds as a distinct remedy did not necessarily require the framework of an 8 (a) (2) violation to make its
effects felt; yet there is persuasiveness in the fact that the vehicle
which the Supreme Court chose to affirm the Board's reimbursement
power was a domination case based on that section of the act. Still,
subsequent decisions make it clear that where closed shop or illegal
union-security conditions exist, even absent an express 8(a) (2)
finding, the Board will require an appropriate disgorgement order.
In fact, the only consistent treatment of the reimbursement remedy

is found in the cases from Coast Aluminum to the present where
the employer executes a contract containing union-security provisions
with a union which is not the majority representative of the em37
ployees.
In Houston Maritime, the Board limited the order to merely the
percentages paid by the employees although Mountain. Pacific had
past policy of not recommending a Brown-Olds remedy in eases where,
during a designated period, the parties voluntarily ceased their unlawful
practices and amended their contracts to conform with the Act. This policy
is discussed infra, p. 513). But compare Gay Eng'r Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 451,
452 (1959), where the Board withheld application of Brown-Olds against the
union which had entered into a settlement agreement prior to the commencement of litigation. The Board applied Brown-Olds to the respondent employer, stating that "the remedy to be applied for the correction of unfair
labor practices lies within the exclusive discretion of the Board, and that the
Brown-Olds remedy is required where the closed-shop prohibitions of the
Act are flagrantly ignored, despite a subsequent correction of unlawful
hiring practices pursuant to the General Counsel's suggested 'reprieve'."
For the reverse situation where the remedy was waived as to one employer
who informally settled the case, see Funeral Directors of Greater St. Louis,
125 N.L.R.B. 241 (1959).
37. Adley Express Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1372 (1959); Paul M. O'Neill Int'l
Detective Agency, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 167 (1959); Sherman Car Wash Equip.
Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 207 (1959) (citing Brown-Olds for what should more
accurately be called the "reimbursement" order); Masters-Lake Success, Inc.,
124 N.L.R.B. 580 (1959); Lundy Mfg. Corp., 125 N.L.R.B. 1188 (1959); Perry
Coal Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1256 (1959); Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. No.
6, 45 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1960). See Superior Derrick Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. No. 27,
45 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1960), where quite properly no reimbursement remedy was
applied. It appeared that the 8 (a) (2) followed, in part, from the employer's
payment of ' membership fees and dues for employees out of its own funds."
(Emphasis added.) Cf. Alco-Gravure, Div. of Publication Corp., 124 N.L.R.B.
1027 (1959), where reimbursement was not ordered despite the finding of an
8(a) (2) violation based on the execution of a pre-hire preferential hire
contract at a time when the union did not represent an uncoerced majority
of the employees. Board Member Rodgers would have required reimbursement whereas the majority of the Board, without explanation, failed to order
such a remedy. It would appear that Member Rodgers' position is sounder
than that taken by the majority insofar as it may be based on the lack
of voluntariness to pay dues and fees where, as in the typical pre-hire
situations, the employees come into a ready-made employment operation
without being afforded the opportunity to select their bargaining representative (see note 20 supra). But cf. section 8(f) of the Labor Management
Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959 which permits pre-hire contracts in the
building and construction industry.
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not been complied with. This apparent oversight was explained in
Galveston Maritime, but the specific bases for reaffirming BrownOlds were not set forth. Galveston Maritime had no elements which
brought the violations within the realm of union-security proscriptions, yet the Board found that section 8(a) (2) had been violated
by the maintenance of the exclusive hiring arrangement which failed
to comport with the criteria in Mountain Pacific. In Houston Maritime the reimbursement order was predicated not only on the failure
to satisfy Mountain Pacific, but also because of the tied-in assistance.
The Board did not stress the 8 (a) (2) violation in Galveston Maritime,
and in distinguishing Houston Maritime, indicated that full disgorgement would have been appropriate, had the Board resolved
its policy regarding Brown-Olds at the time of decision. Except for
the conjectural implications inherent in any distinguished set of decisions, it does not appear that the Board in Galveston Maritime
required, or relied upon, the presence of an 8 (a) (2) allegation, since
other cases, both prior, 38 and subsequent, 39 to Galveston Maritime,
carried a reimbursement order in the absence of a finding of assistance. However, it is to be borne in mind that most of these cases arose
in the building and construction industry in which 8 (a) (2) charges
are rarely sought. In Houston Maritime and Galveston Maritime,
presumably, employment relationships were stable enough to warrant
the usual Bowman-type remedy, 40 and therefore the 8 (a) (2) finding
merely premised and supported the "cease recognition" portion of
41
the order, but not the reimbursement portion.
Further, it does not appear that whether dues are paid pursuant
to check-off authorizations, or by the employees directly to a union
steward or other union representative, will materially affect the
38. Grand Union Co., supra note 31; Millwrights', Local 2232 (the Farmsworth Chambers, Inc., case), 122 N.L.R.B. 300 (1958); Local 450, Operating
Eng'rs (the Tellepsen Constr. Co. case), 122 N.L.R.B. 564 (1958); Local 85,
Sheet Metal Workers (the Gassaway case), 122 N.L.R.B. 631 (1958).
39. See Appendix I, for a collection of cases in which 8(a) (2) aspects
are totally lacking and where the Board included the reimbursement remedy.
(Henceforth, where citation to these cases is necessary, the reader will be
referred to Appendix I).
40. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 387 (1957), enforced in part
sub nom District 50, UVIWA v. NLRB, 237 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir., 1956), vacated
and remanded, 355 U.S. 453 (1958).
41. Cf. Kaiser Steel Corp., 125 N.L.R.B. 1039, (1959), where the Board
found a violation of 8(a) (2) and ordered reimbursement but because
the illegal contract provision was severable from the rest of the contract
the Board did not apply its customary "withdrawal of recognition" order.
See also Lykes Bros., 128 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 46 L.R.R.M. 1347 (1960), where
a majority of the Board (Member Bean, dissenting) did not require the
employer to cease recognizing the assisted union because all of the acts of
assistance occurred after the execution of a contract which, on its face, was
lawful. However, the employer and union were ordered, jointly and
severally, to reimburse "all employees who were individually coerced to
sign dues check-off cards." (Emphasis added.)
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rationale underlying the Board's order. Whether there is traditional
assistance to, or foisting of, a union upon the employees, a correlation
between payment of dues and fees and membership vis a vis a section
7 right may exist; and if it does, the Board brings the general language of section 10 (c) into operation. Thus, if the operative facts
disclose that the employees are required to pay dues, fees, and other
monies in order to secure or retain employment, even absent a finding
of "assistance" by an employer in the collection of these monies, the
Board orders reimbursement, in what it believes to be a proper exercise of its administrative expertise in fashioning remedial measures
which effectuate the purposes of the act.
UNION-SECURITY ANM MOUNTAIN PACIFIC
SITUATIONS: THE CASES
Reference to the cases decided before November 1, 1958, (the date
signifying the end of the Brown-Olds grace period) yields little in
the way of enlightenment. General Counsel Fenton indicated that
during the initial three month period,42 later extended to November
1, 1958,43 he would not recommend Brown-Olds where the parties
voluntarily sought to correct their illegal union-security and hiring
arrangements. Thus, many cases in which one might reasonably expect to find Brown-Olds applied, but which lack any type of disgorgement remedy, may well be accounted for on the basis of Board
accession to the General Counsel's policy.4 4
After the moratorium was lifted, a few cases contained language
which expressly recognized this factor as a possible explanation for
the absence of the remedy. 45 Accordingly, except where retrogression
is deemed warranted because of some apparent peculiarity in the
nature of the case, this discussion will be confined to the decisions
rendered since the moratorium.
42. This period was to extend from April 1, 1958, to June 1, 1958. See

41 LAB. REr,. REP. 359 (1958).

43. The General Counsel extended the grace period from June 1, 1958, to
September 1, 1958 [42 LAB. REL. REP. 9]. In an effort to accommodate BrownOlds to the inherent difficulties recognized in amending contracts and correcting practices to conform with the law, the General Counsel further extended the grace period to November 1, 1958, for those parties who had
commenced changing their arrangements prior to September 1, 1958 [42
LAB. REr. REP. 473].

44. But see K. M. & M. Constr. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1958), where the
General Counsel and Trial Examiner recommended reimbursement of all
dues, fees and assessments in a situation involving an illegal union-security
clause and a failure to comply with Mountain Pacific. The Board, without
comment, did not adopt these recommendations.
45. See quoted language in text, supra p. 510, and supra note 36. And see

the recent expression in Locals 24 & 75, Bricklayers and Masons (the Booth
& Flinn Co. cases), 129 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 47 L.R.R.M. 1078 (1960).
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Los Angeles 46 was the first case after the moratorium which called
for disgorgement predicated upon the rationale of Brown-Olds, and
it arose in the context of an exclusive referral arrangement which
failed to satisfy the requirements of Mountain Pacific. Although
there was no issue raised regarding union-security, the Board found
that the employees were coerced into paying dues and fees, because
of the illegal hiring provisions in the contract which encouraged
employees to join the union.
At the same time the Board extended the Brown-Olds remedy to
cover hiring situations which were violative of the act only because
of a failure to satisfy Mountain Pacific, it also began to limit the
operation of the remedy in those cases where the union-security
provisions were illegal. In PhiladelphiaWoodwork Co. 47 the Board
withheld application of Brown-Olds because the violation bordered
on the "technical," as contrasted to the "substantive," provisions of
the act. The violation was established by the execution of a contract
containing union-security provisions at a time when the union was
not in compliance with the filing requirements of the act,48 although
the contractual provisions on their face did not exceed the permissible
limits set forth in the proviso to section 8(a) (3). Thus, recalling
the "assistance" cases, although the execution of a union-security
agreement by a union which does not represent a majority of the
employees is flagrant enough to warrant Brown-Olds, mere noncompliance is not. Apparently, the former aspect goes to the substantive features of the act whereas the latter (procedural) violation
is technical. Philadelphia Woodwork was reaffirmed in Schenley
49
Distillers,
where again noncompliance was the defective element
46. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1629 (1958). The
following pre-Los Angeles cases also involved violations of Mountain Pacific
but failed to require a Brown-Olds remedy (presumably because of the
General Counsel's moratorium): Carpenters' and Millwright Union (the
Charles S. Wood Co. case), 121 N.L.R.B. 543 (1958); Hod Carriers, Local
324 (the Roy Price, Inc. case), 121 N.L.R.B. 508 (1958); Houston Maritime
Ass'n, 121 N.L.R.B. 389 (1958); Sheet Metal Workers, Local 99 (the Dohrmann Hotel Supply Co. case), 120 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1958); Local 250 United
Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. (the
Bechtel Corp. case), 120 N.L.R.B. 930 (1958); Booth & Flinn Co., 120 N.L.R.B.
545 (1958). In Foundation Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1453 (1958), the Board refused
to find an employer's unilaterally instituted hiring policy as violative of
Mountain Pacific; but it did find that the employer violated section 8(a) (3)
of the Act, by executing a union-security agreement at a time when no
workers were employed-yet the Board failed to order reimbursement. See
also Alco-Gravure, supra note 37, respecting the pre-hire point.
47. 121 N.L.R.B. 1642 (1958).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (f), (g), (h) (1958).
49. Local 392, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing
& Pipefitting Indus. (the Schenley Distillers case), 122 N.L.R.B. 613 (1958).
A sidelight of some interest is the fact that the Board's cease and desist
order specifically cited Mountain Pacific as being the outer limit upon which
clearance or approval might be required by the union. In a few subsequent
cases, the Board repeated this method of notifying employees of the precedent
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in what would otherwise have been a lawful union-security agreement.
A few subsequent cases indicated that the Board definitely established this exception as a rule.5 0 In Union De Soldadores,51 the
Board separated the union-security provisions (those provided for
in the proviso to section 8 (a) (3)) from the hiring provisions of the
contract. The Board found that the union-security provisions were
not illegal on their face and that the only impediment to their
legality was that the union was not in compliance with the filing sections of the act. Citing PhiladelphiaWoodwork, the Board said: "For
the reasons stated [therein], we would not require reimbursement
of moneys paid by employees by virtue of such contract as
recommended by the Trial Examiner. ' 52 However, the Board also
found that pursuant to other provisions of the contract, the employer
and union enforced an arrangement wherein preference in hiring was
given to members of the union, and nonmembers were required to
obtain clearance from the union as a condition of employment. On
the basis of these illegal hiring provisions, the Board held both
respondent unions 53 liable for reimbursing the affected employees.
upon which the violations were predicated, e.g., Local 1566, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Appendix I; Local 176, United Bhd. of Carpenters (the
Dimeo Constr. Co. case), Appendix I; International Union of Operating
Eng'rs, Local 150 (the Fluor Co. case), Appendix I. It would seem that if
the Board is attempting to notify employees of their rights to be referred
pursuant to objective nondiscriminatory standards, the Board should have
said so in plain, simple terms instead of citing a prior decision which stands
for the proposition. The Board has frequently relied upon court pronouncements condemning contractual provisions which were not written in language
which an ordinary workingman would readily understand, e.g., Local 1566,
ILA, Appendix I, citing NLRB v. Shuck Constr. Co., 243 F.2d 519 (9th Cir.
1957) and Red Star Express Lines of Auburn, Inc. v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 78 (2d
Cir. 1952). How readily would an ordinary workingman understand the
significance of Mountain Pacific, even if he were to go to a local law library
and read the decision?
50. Perry Coal Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1256 (1959), is no exception to this exception. There, the Board found several bases for concluding that the
employer violated section 8(a) (2), one of which being the execution of a
union-security contract at a time when the union (UMW) was not in
compliance. However, sufficient factors existed to warrant reimbursement
apart from the noncompliance aspect.
51. Union de Soldadores, Local 1839, 122 N.L.R.B. 1603 (1959).
52. Id. at 1604.
53. In this case, the employer was not named as a respondent. Recalling
Broderick Wood, the Board, with court approval, required both the employer
and union to refund all dues and fees coercively obtained under the illegal
union-security provision in their collective bargaining agreement. This
treatment appears to be consistent with the principles of joint-tortfeasor
liability flowing from the joint commission of an illegal act. Insofar as a
reimbursement order directed against only one of the parties may seem harsh
(particularly if the sole respondent is the employer, since it is the union
which receives and retains the dues and fees collected), it is to be noted that
the Board, in framing its order, is necessarily restricted to the parties-respondent named in an unfair labor practice charge. Thus, if a charge is filed
naming either the employer or the union as respondent, the Board could not
order the unnamed party to an illegal arrangement to comply with its reim-
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Further, in Argo Steel,54 the Board adverted to the presence of
PhiladelphiaWoodwork factors in allowing an exception to a reimbursement order. But the Board, unfortunately, phrased its reference
in language which raises, rather than clarifies, questions as to the
propriety of the exception as such. The facts indicated that the
contract in issue, which was executed in 1956, incorporated working
rules of the union which created closed-shop conditions. The Board
noted that it was over ten years since Congress had outlawed closedshop contracts and practices, and yet the parties had so very recently
enacted the proscribed type of contract. The Board then said: "This
is not the result of a mere technical oversight to the making of an
otherwise lawful union security contract. '55 One inference which
may be drawn from the above-quoted language is that a contract
which creates closed shop conditions because of the inclusion of certain of the union's working rules, does not require Brown-Olds if
the parties are able to show that such provisions were inadvertently
incorporated into the agreements. However, the Board was immunized from such a possible construction by the words "otherwise
lawful," since the facts therein compelled the conclusion that working rules which are tantamount to a closed-shop arrangement could
not be considered lawful. But, the clear import of the Board's phraseology, arguably, was to extend PhiladelphiaWoodwork even further.
As long as a union-security agreement was lawful in all respects
save compliance, the Board would not order Brown-Olds, on the
basis (assumption) that non-compliance was an oversight. In effect,
the Board was excusing the parties from liability if they failed to
comply; but was the Board prepared to permit other noncomplying
-parties to avail themselves of the benefits which compliance carries
with it? The act is a statute of uniform application, the provisions of
which everyone is presumed to know. If a union failed to comply
with the filing provisions of sections 9 (f), (g) and (h), it was not
entitled to be certified as the majority representative of the employees in a Board conducted election.56 Nor was the noncomplying
union afforded the right to file unfair labor practice charges. 7 Yet,
why should not a union have been able to show that its failure to
comply was an "oversight" which, consistent with Philadelphia
Woodwork and Argo Steel, was merely technical and should therefore be discounted? Fair play dictates such a consideration; if nonbursement orders. Accordingly, the order directed in Union de Soldadores
was the only type possible.
54. Argo Steel Constr. Co., Appendix I.
55. 122 N.L.R.B. at 1084 (Emphasis added.)
56. Sections 9 (f), (g) and (h) of the act.
57. Sections 9(g), and (h) of the act. See also Publishers Printing Co.,
110 N.L.R.B. 55 (1954).
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compliance is excusable in one instance, it should be excusable in
another. Yet, to do so would be the same as administratively
excising sections 9 (f), (g) and (h) from the act. Query, did not
PhiladelphiaWoodwork constitute the first step in that direction? 58
However, even though the 1959 amendment removes inadvertent
noncompliance as a basis for exception to the Brown-Olds scheme, the
concept of the "technical violation" may be regarded as part of the
Board's body of precepts in determining remedial action. Thus, the
conceptual basis for the rule of PhiladelphiaWoodwork may percolate down through future decisions as a basis for disallowing BrownOlds in nonflagrant, technically violative situations. 59
In E & B Brewing Co.,6o the Board carved out a further exception
from the Brown-Olds scheme. The trial examiner concluded that an
exclusive hiring hall agreement, which the union agreed to operate
nondiscriminatorily, was a valid defense to charges of individual
discrimination in referral. The Board disagreed, relying on the
absence of one of the three prerequisites to legality as expounded in
Mountain Pacific. However, the Board chose not to order BrownOlds, as contended for by the General Counsel, on the ground that
he failed to allege "a substantively unlawful contract or hiring practice."
In E & B, the foundation upon which the Board relied for the
denial of a Brown-Olds remedy was Philadelphia Woodwork, with
an indirect reference to Los Angeles. In the former case the Board
noted that despite the usual 30-day union-security language in the
contract, the union had caused an employee to be discharged for
nonmembership after two days of employment. The Board said that
this was evidence of an illegal hiring practice but since such practice was not alleged or litigated it would not consider the violation,
or the applicability of Brown-Olds. In Los Angeles, on facts nearly
identical to those existing in E & B, the Board, in a footnote, rejected
the respondent's contention that the legality of the contract was not
put in issue, on the basis of the broad language in the charges 61 and
58. The second step was achieved by Congress in its enactment of section
201(d) of Title II, Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
effective November 13, 1959, which repealed the requirements of sections
9(f), (g) and (h).
59. See Harbur Terminal Co., 126 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 45 L.R.R.M. 1362 (1960),
where the Board did not order a Brown-Olds remedy where the violation
was predicated solely on the employer's failure to post the exclusive hiring
hall provisions. Cf. Local 466, IBEW (the Moore Elec. Co. case), 126 N.L.R.B.
No. 110, 45 L.R.R.M. 1406 (1960), where the Board said: "[Wle do not,
however, adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusion that an inadvertent failure to
delete an unlawful provision relieves that provision of its otherwise clear
illegality." But see Hooker Chem. Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 46 L.R.R.M.
1447 (1960).
60. 122 N.L.R.B. 354 (1958).
61. The charges alleged specific violations of the act and concluded with
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the fact that respondents themselves put the contract in issue by
raising it as a defense to the allegations of discrimination.62
The Board's reliance in E & B upon its prior expression in Philadelphia Woodwork appears well placed, and is consistent with earlier
Board decisions. 63 However, Los Angeles may be taken to stand in a
position directly opposed to E & B on the point for which it was
presumably cited. Unquestionably there was no allegation in E & B
attacking the contract or practices, and after reviewing the facts
the Board stated: "On these facts . . .the Trial Examiner concluded

that the hiring-hall contract was legal and valid, and constituted a
defense to the conduct of the Company and the Union."6 4 But though
the Board disagreed with the trial examiner's conclusion, namely,
that the contract was legal, it did not attempt to reconcile its own
conclusionary statement, that Brown-Olds was inapplicable because
of a deficiency in pleading, with the fact that the contract's legality
must have been put into issue if the trial examiner was properly in
a position to conclude, albeit erroneously, that the contract was
valid.6 5 To put it another way, in Los Angeles, the Board predicated
its violation of Mountain Pacific on the existence of a contract, which
was put into issue by way of defense by the respondents. The Board
then required a Brown-Olds reimbursement remedy. In E & B the
Board refused to accept the trial examiner's conclusion that the
contract was a valid defense, and found a violation. Yet, as stated
in the remedial portion of the decision, because there was no allegation of "a substantively unlawful contract or hiring practice," the
Board withheld ordering disgorgement. In the light of Los Angeles,
the absence of Brown-Olds in E & B appears to be, on its face, inthe general language, "by these and other acts." (Emphasis added.) See
Triboro Carting Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 775 (1957).
62. Footnote 2 of the Board's decision in Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, supranote 46.
63. Local 250, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing
& Pipefitting Indus. (the Bechtel Corp. case), supra note 46; Hod Carriers
(the Roy Price, Inc. case), supra note 46; Local 10, ILW (the Pacific Maritime
Ass'n case), 121 N.L.R.B. 938 (1958).
64. 122 N.L.R.B. at 355. (Emphasis added.)
65. See United States Steel Corp. (the American Bridge case), Appendix I,
where the Trial Examiner concluded that the complaint failed to allege
sufficient facts to encompass a finding of an illegal exclusive hiring arrangement. The Board rejected this view on the ground that the General Counsel
was proceeding on a theory of an implied agreement which the allegations
would support. The Board said, "Indeed, the Trial Examiner so understood
the General Counsel'stheory and adversely ruled on his contention." (Emphasis
added.) However, cf. Consolidated W. Steel Div., 122 N.L.R.B. 859 (1959), in
which case the complaint alleged an illegal agreement but failed specifically
to allege a failure to comply with the requirements of Mountain Pacific.
The respondents offered the contract as a defense to the alleged illegal refusal to refer the charging party. The Board rejected the defense because
the contract itself was illegal (in accord with Los Angeles-Seattle Motor
Express), but because the Board noted that such illegality was not alleged,
it issued no order with respect to the agreement.
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explicable. There appears to be no basis for the Board's conclusion in
E & B, unless the Board intended it to stand for the proposition
that not only was the contract not a defense, but also that it could
not be referred to for any purpose whatsoever. Yet is it not true
that where the Board finds unfair labor practices, it has the power to
fashion suitable remedies, guided by its own considerations so long
as they tend to effectuate the policies of the act?
If reliance is placed upon the preceding argument, namely, that
the contract in E & B was put in issue, then we have a factual
situation in apposition to Los Angeles. Why was Brown-Olds applied
in the latter, but not in the former? If Los Angeles is good law,
to the extent that it stands for the proposition that Brown-Olds is
warranted where the only inhibition to an otherwise legal contract
is the absence of Mountain Pacific safeguards, then E & B is wrong.
66
But for the recent Board pronouncement in Nassau & Suffolk, it
could well be argued that in E & B the Board was attempting to
67
narrow the scope and import of Los Angeles.
There is yet another aspect of this series of cases which casts
further doubt on the vitality of the Los Angeles order. Recalling
Philadelphia Woodwork, the Board there made the distinction between "substantive" and "technical" violations, and ordered BrownOlds in the former but withheld it in the latter. As noted therein,
the technical violation was failure to comply with one of the act's
procedural requirements. Similarly, it may be said that in E & B,
the failure to allege facts which constituted a substantive violation
amounted to a "technical" violation. This would appear to be
reasonable only if it is conceded that the existence of an exclusive
hiring hall arrangement, which is violative of the act only because
of a failure to comply with the requirements of Mountain Pacific,
is not a substantive violation, i.e., one requiring the application of
Brown-Olds. Obviously, if E & B does not stand for such a proposition, then Los Angeles is implicitly overruled, or at the very least,
rendered meaningless on the question of disgorgement since one of
the three criteria (posting) was lacking in Los Angeles.
In Philadelphia Woodwork it was relatively easy to justify as
"technical," a failure to comply with a statutory filing requirement; 68
66. Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs (the Nassau & Suffolk case),
123 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1959), discussed infra, p. 528.
67. The import of E & B appears to be that although there may be various
portions of a record established before a trial examiner which disclose
substantive violations and which the Board may conclude deserve remedial
action, at least insofar as Brown-Olds is concerned, an affirmative burden
is placed on the General Counsel to allege such violation before the Board
will impose its Brown-Olds order. Can it be that this self-imposed disdain
is, in whole or in part, recognition of the intrinsic "penalty" features of
Brown-Olds?
68. Compare discussion supra, p. 514.
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perhaps because of the juristic predilection to characterize "procedural" matters as nonsubstantive; or perhaps because depending
upon this primary characterization, the applicability of a particularly
stringent remedial order was to hinge. If the Board felt that in
E & B a legalistically sound basis for distinction was deemed necessary to justify a shift from the broad import of Los Angeles to something less severe, the groundwork was laid in PhiladelphiaWoodwork.
Thereafter, whenever a situation like Los Angeles is presented, the
Board need only find a procedural loop-hole and deny Brown-Olds on
the basis of the procedural "technicality." Naturally, this is speculative and the true test would arise in a procedurally airtight case in
which the violation consisted of a contractual failure to comply with
Mountain Pacific. In such a case, the Board would have no alternative
but to reaffirm Los Angeles or expressly overrule it. 69
Before continuing with an examination of the Brown-Olds policy
it is significant that all of the cases decided during the period
between Los Angeles and E & B, in which reimbursement was
ordered, involved union-security situations; none of the elements
relating to a Mountain Pacific situation were present.70 In all of
these cases disgorgement was limited to the employees of the employer at whose situs the coerced payments were made. Thus, the
Board seemed to be harkening back to the express holding of BrownOlds where it ordered the union to cease giving effect to its illegal
contract with any and all parties, but ordered disgorgement only
where the evidence disclosed that the contract was actually enforced.
As will be seen, however, the Board modified this policy in subsequent
cases.
The cases immediately following E & B contain factors which tend
to smother, rather than amplify, comprehension of the scene. For
example in the Mechanical Handling Systems Case,7 1 the Board
found unlawful an oral agreement between the employer and the
local, which implemented a master agreement between the International and the employer, which in toto was equivalent to a closed
69. But cf. News Syndicate Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 818 (1959), where the Board
did neither.
70. Millwrights Local 2232 (the Farnsworth & Chambers, Inc. case), 122
N.L.R.B. 300 (1958); Carpenter's Dist. Council of Rochester (the RochesterDavis-Fetch case), 122 N.L.R.B. 269 (1958); Lakeland Bus Lines, 122 N.L.R.B.
281 (1958); A. 0. Smith Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 321 (1958). In Millwrights the

contractual coupling of the delegation to foremen of authority to hire and

fire, with the requirement that foremen be union members, was held to
amount in effect to a closed shop. In Carpenters, the contract required the
employer to employ only union members and the union was empowered
to replace nonunion employees with union members. In Lakeland, the unionsecurity provision on its face, clearly violated the proviso to 8(a) (3). In
A. 0. Smith, the contract, containing a lawful union-security clause, was
executed at a time before the employer had a representative working force.
71. 122 N.L.R.B. 613, enforced, 273 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1960).
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shop scheme. The Board further found that the contracts were enforced, and therefore ordered the employer and local, jointly and
severally, to reimburse all the employees involved.
2 the union-security
As previously noted, in Schenley Distillers7
provisions were held to be unlawful because of union noncompliance
when the contract was executed. Consistent with PhiladelphiaWoodwork, the Board held that Brown-Olds was not warranted. Individual
discrimination was also found, but because the General Counsel did
not allege the existence of an illegal understanding or arrangement,
the Board was unable to find a violation predicated on Mountain
Pacific rationale. Without citing E & B, the Board seems to be rendering an implicit reaffirmation of the proposition set forth therein.
In Schenley Distillers, the General Counsel erred by failing to
allege the illegality of the contract or arrangement. The Board
had been indicating that enforcement of the contract or maintenance
of a practice was necessary to warrant Brown-Olds. Naturally, in the
absence of an illegal contract or practice which would otherwise
require remedial action, the Board would be without power to order
reimbursement. However, the failure to allege is not equal to proof
of nonexistence. It is submitted that even without an allegation,
sufficient probative evidence may have been introduced to amount to
proof of a practice. Furthermore, there is some indication that the
Board was also aware of this argument at a time prior to its de3
cision.7
72. See note 49 supra.
73. In Philadelphia Woodwork, supra note 47, the Board noted that the
union had caused the discharge of a nonmember employee after two days of
employment, although a lawful (30-day) union-security agreement was in
effect. The Board indicated that "this is evidence of an illegal hiring practice, and if in fact such illegality were proved, would warrant Brown-Olds."
The Board did not consider the violation or the applicability of Brown-Olds
because the illegal hiring practice was neither alleged nor litigated. For a
more affirmative showing, see Local 469, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (the
Rasmussen case), 122 N.L.R.B. 674 (1958), where the Board noted that
since a nonmember employee was discriminated against, in the face of a
valid union-security agreement, the only basis must be that a preferential
hiring arrangement existed, pursuant to which the union was delegated
the authority to hire or clear applicants. If the union-security provisions
were illegal, the fact that it exercised this authority unlawfully would
seem to be an unnecessary factor in finding a violation since it is
well established that the mere existence of an illegal provision in a
collective

bargaining

agreement,

is violative of sections

8(a) (1)

apart from

and (3)

its

actual

enforcement,

and 8(b) (1) (A)

and

(2)

of the act. Gottfried Bakery, 103 N.L.R.B. 227, affd as modified, 210 F.2d
772 (2d Cir. 1954); Red Star Express, 93 N.L.R.B. 127, aif'd, 196 F.2d 78 (2d

Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1952), affd,
347 U.S. 17 (1954). Perhaps the most elucidating enunciation of the applicability of Brown-Olds may be found in Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs (the Nassau & Suffolk case), 123 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1959), where,
inter alia, the Board said: 'n our opinion, the existence of an unlawful
contract is sufficient in and of itself to establish the element of coercion in
the payment of monies by employees pursuant to the requirements of such
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Conceding the propriety of Brown-Olds where a contract, on its
face, illegally encourages union membership, there is merit to the
view that where the evidence discloses encouragement in fact, the
restitutionary considerations are even more compelling. The problem
then becomes solely a matter of what weight the evidence is to
receive in the establishment of the practice. Once that stage is
reached, however, the Board may be guided by its own expertise in
evaluating the situation at hand, and determining when to apply
Brown-Olds on an ad hoc basis. Certainly one of the guides might
be whether the individual discrimination was pursuant to an agreement.7 4 Another might be whether the discrimination was isolated or
whether, in fact, other employees were encouraged to become union
members by the unlawful conduct. Finding others should not prove
to be too difficult.
Portland Home Builders,7 5 was replete with violations. The Board
found an illegal union-security agreement, an exclusive hiring contract which failed to provide for the Mountain Pacific safeguards,
and practices pursuant to it. Although the Board found, and relied
upon, the illegal practices in providing for the remedy, the trial
examiner, relying upon Brown-Olds specifically, refused to recommend reimbursement because there was no evidence to show that the
closed shop contract was enforced. In other cases previously mentioned, the Board considered whether the contract was enforced or not
to determine which employees would be entitled to reimbursement.
Here, sub silentio, the Board is ignoring the absence of enforcement
and ordering disgorgement anyway. It is of significance, however, to
7
note that the Board did find evidence of illegal practices.
a contract. Accordingly, the [Brown-Olds] remedy is applicable to all closed
shop and exclusive hiring hall agreements, which do not provide the safeguards set forth in the Mountain Pacific decision." Id. at 1409.
74. See Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, supra note 46, where the
Board found that the alleged individual discrimination "was the result of
the Respondent's implementation of the hiring provisions of their contract."
(Emphasis added.) See also Local 369, Hod Carriers (the Frommeyer case),
114 N.L.R.B. 872, enforced, 240 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1956).
75. Joint Council of Teamsters (the Portland Home Builders case), 122
N.L.R.B. 514 (1958).
76. But query, is the Board equating the finding of a practice with its
requirement for enforcement? "Enforcement" connotes the existence of specific acts which collectively reinforce the provisions of the contract. This is
However,
the same characterization which could be applied to a practice. "practices,'
since the Board has not distinguished between "enforcement" and
it is submitted that "enforcement" should be deemed as something less
flagrant than a "practice." For example, under this interpretation, the mere
maintenance of an illegal agreement would be the enforcement of it, while
the wide spread acts of actual discrimination would constitute the practices.
See District 50, UMW (the Herbert Chem. Co. case), 122 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1959),
where the Board adopted the trial examiner's conclusion that a "practice"
requires a showing of more than one example of discrimination. It may
be argued that in the light of the Board's recent decision in Nassau &
Suffolk, supra note 66, any question respecting a showing that the illegal
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For example, in Tellepsen,77 the next case decided by the Board,
there was evidence of individual discrimination and illegal hiring
practices. The contractual provisions were apparently lawful on their
face; yet on the basis of these practices alone, the Board ordered all
of the employees reimbursed. The Trial Examiner preferred to leave
the reimbursement of dues and fees to the compliance stage as the
evidence was not clear that all of the employees had been coerced
into making payment. The Board rejected this, saying: "Contrary to
the implications in the Intermediate Report, we find that the requirement of membership in good standing as a condition of employment establishes that the Respondent Union coerced employees into
paying these moneys. '7 8 Thus, it may be said that where the Board
finds practices which indicate the existence of a closed shop, the
Board will find that all of the employees were coerced, and order
them reimbursed. How much different is Tellepsen from Brown-Olds,
Los Angeles, Lakeland, or the myriad others which base reimbursement on the coercive effects of an illegal contract? As previously
submitted, the proof of a practice would seem to be stronger evidence
that the employees are actually encouraged to become union members, than, for example, the existence of a contract failing to provide
the Mountain Pacific criteria which merely raise an inference of
unlawful encouragement.7 9
0 the Board found that although
Similarly, in Galveston Maritime,"
the contractual provisions which created the exclusive hiring arrangement were deleted, the respondents continued to carry on a practice
as if these provisions were still in effect. Again the Board found
contract was enforced is rendered moot. There, the Board said that "proof
was actual exaction of monies from employees under an unlawful contract
is [no longer required) to warrant the remedy of reimbursement." However,
the Board expressly found that the "closed shop conditions of employment"
were enforced. Apparently, N'assau & Suffolk does not squarely overrule
the body of cases which seem to stand for the proposition that enforcement
of the contract or practices pursuant thereto are elements prerequisite to
the imposition of a reimbursement remedy. However, this case does clearly
establish the legal principle that in seeking such remedy, proof of actual
payments of monies is not required; the mere existence of the unlawful contract is a sufficient showing of coercion to justify reimbursement.
77. Local 450, Operating Eng'rs (the Tellepsen Constr. Co. case), 122
N.L.R.B. 564 (1958).
78. Id. at 569.
79. Joint Council of Teamsters, supra note 75. It is elementary that the
question of remedy only arises after a violation is found. And to say in
any particular situation that a violation does in fact exist is to recognize
that the question of selecting an appropriate remedy depends upon the
exercise of discretion. Where the violation is predicated upon facts which
juridically are self-sustaining, the choice of remedy would appear to be
free from censure if the remedy is directly related to these operative facts.
Where, however, the remedy flows not directly from the operative facts, but
rather from an inference (coercion) which is drawn from the facts, the
more stringent the remedy, the less acceptable is the exercise of discretion.
80. 122 N.L.R.B. 692 (1958).
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adequate justification for Brown-Olds based upon the existence of a
practice which failed to satisfy Mountain Pacific. It is significant to
note that in Galveston Maritime, the Board, while holding the union
and the employer association liable, jointly and severally, expressly
limited reimbursement to the employees of each individual employer
member, so that one employer-member would not be liable to the
employees of another. Most of the prior cases dealt with only one employer, and the reimbursement was limited to the employees discriminated against at the employer's locus of operations. This was true
even where the employer's operations extended to many different
geographic positions. 81 But in Galveston Maritime we have the first
clear enunciation of what appears to be an equitable division of
reimbursement liability, as well as an express statement that the
Board has been aware of the complications which Brown-Olds had
82
wrought.
Finally, in I.T.U.83 the Board continued to follow this equitable
distinction it made in Galveston Maritime. The Board held, fitrst, that
the contract provisions were unlawful as written, without reference
to the hiring practices; second, that Brown-Olds was warranted because of the unlawful contract (unlawful because it failed to include
the Mountain Pacific safeguards); third, that the respondents would
be jointly and severally liable for reimbursing all of the employees
at the respondent employer's mail room, but that the respondent
union alone would be liable for reimbursing employees at the mail
room of an employer who was a party to the contract, but who was
not a named respondent. On the surface, this appears to be a reaffirmation of Los Angeles, in that the existence of a contract, illegal because it fails to comply with Mountain Pacific, and apart from
practices performed in pursuance of its terms, will be sufficient justification for Brown-Olds application. However, despite the rather clear
language which emphasizes the contract and softens the effects of the
practices, the Board did devote considerable attention to the operation
of the apprentice system and preferential hiring practices. The existence of these practices may have influenced the Board, but in the face
of such clear and unconditional language, how reasonable would it be
81. Sheetmetal Workers, Local 85, supra note 38, where the trial examiner
recommended limiting Brown-Olds to all of the employees on the project
where the individual discrimination occurred. The Board, (citing Tellepsen,
supra note 77) extended the remedy to all of the employees at all of the
business locations of the employer within the territorial jurisdiction of the
respondent union.
82. See supra note 8. See the explication in Nassau & Suffolk, supra
note 66.
83. International Typographical Union (the News Syndicate Co. case), 122
N.L.R.B. 818, enforcement denied sub nom. NLRB v. News Syndicate Co.,
279 F.2d 323 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 81 Sup. Ct. 166 (1960).
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to attach significance to a factor which the Board considered and,
presumably after due deliberation, rejected?8
Several recent decisions of the Board deserve special consideration
because of their rather sudden departure from the previously mentioned scheme. In Harbur Terminal Co.,85 the Board adopted the
trial examiner's recommendation to waive application of the BrownOlds remedy against the employer, the only respondent involved. The
violation was predicated upon the employer's failure to post the
notices relating to the operation of the hiring hall, as required by
safeguard three of the Mountain Pacific decision. The trial examiner
concluded that such failure was but a technical violation and based
his recommendation upon the Philadelphia Woodwork precedent.
The Board adopted the recommendation on the grounds that it was
not clear whether, in fact, an agreement for the establishment of an
exclusive hiring hall existed between the employer and the union,
and in any event, the union operated a nondiscriminatory hiring hall.
In Nordberg-SelahFruit,Inc.P the Board found illegal on its face a
union-security provision of the respondents' contract which would
have required employees, who had made application for membership
in the union prior to the execution of the contract, to pay the back
dues and fees which had accrued before the contract became effective.
The Board did not, however, include a Brown-Olds remedy in its
order. Improperly relying on PhiladelphiaWoodwork, the Board said,
In the Brown-Olds precedent, there was a bald closed-shop contract
that conditioned employment of all employees upon union membership
without the benefit of the 30-day grace period. . . . It thus constituted a
flagrant violation in open defiance of statutory policy. On the other
hand . . . the union-security clauses involved herein affect only a
limited class of employees and are illegal only because some employees
are by the terms thereof not afforded the full 30-day grace period required by the proviso to 8(a) (3); these clauses did not, however, in any
way grant to the Union control over the hiring of employees.87
If the italicized language is to be given its literal significance, the
Board is indicating that Brown-Olds is reserved solely for illegal

hiring situations where all of the employees constituting the working
force are coerced through closed shop or Mountain Pacific violative

arrangements.
84. Particularly in the light of Nassau & Suffolk, supra note 66, where
the Board not only explicated the scope of Brown-Olds applicability but
also set forth the language definitively establishing certain basic ground
rules which appear to reject any argument premised upon a consideration of
contractual enforcement or "practices." See also Funeral Directors of
Greater St. Louis, 125 N.L.R.B. 241 (1959).
85. 126 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 45 L.R.R.M. 1362 (1960).
86. Nordberg-Selah Fruit, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 45 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1960).
87. 45 L.R.R.M. at 1384. (Emphasis added.)
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Chun King Sales Co.88 is another case in which the Board found
a union-security clause to be illegal on its face because it failed to
provide the requisite grace period for old and new employees. In
addition, the Board found the contractual provision to have been
enforced. The Board refused to apply Brown-Olds on reasoning substantially identical to that employed in Nordberg-Selah. However,
Board members Bean and Rodgers would have adopted the trial
examiner's recommendation and incorporated the Brown-Olds remedy
in the affirmative provisions of the Board's order.
Finally, in Jaworski Sausage Co.,8 9 the Board withheld application
of the remedy, citing Chun King, where the union-security provisions
of the contract provided a mere five days after initial employment
for employees to become members of the union. As previously noted,
members Bean and Rodgers dissented in Chun King; however, the
instant case was decided by a three member panel consisting of
Chairman Leedom and Board members Bean and Jenkins. Member
Bean agreed with the majority and distinguished his present position
from that taken in Chun King solely on the ground that whereas
the illegal union-security provision was illegally enforced in Chun
King, the instant "unlawful clause was enforced only in a lawful
manner" (in other words, it was not enforced at all since employees
were given the full 30-day grace period).9o
DIscussIoN OF UNION-SECURITY AND MOUNTAIN PACIFIC
SITUATIONS INCLUDING COURT DECISIONS
Aside from the 8(a) (2) situations, Brown-Olds has been applied
in two other situations: (1) where the union-security provisions exceed the limits of the proviso to 8 (a) (3), and (2) where the exclusive
hiring arrangement does not provide for the safeguards set forth in
Mountain Pacific. Although both violations find their origin in the
statute, the former is derived from terms specifically set forth in
section 8 (a) (3) of the statute, while the latter is a creation of the
Board, founded upon general language and policies arising in the
course of decision-making. This does not render the latter any less
valid, but on the other hand, it does permit greater weight to be
given to countervailing arguments regarding the efficacy of remedial
88. 126 N.L.R.B. No. 98,45 L.R.R.M. 1392 (1960).

89. Local 569, Packinghouse Workers (the Frank Jaworski Sausage case),
126 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 45 L.R.R.M. 1394 (1960).
90. Despite Nassau & Suffolk, supra note 66, it would appear that a
forceful argument could still be made that "enforcement" is a vital element
for justifying imposition of the remedy. See Shear's Pharmacy, Inc., 128
N.L.R.B. No. 124, 46 L.R.R.M. 1464 (1960), and particularly Member Jenkins'
dissent at 1464. Compare this dissent with his dissent in Southeastern Plate
Glass Co., 129 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 46 L.R.R.M. 1562 (1960).

1961]

N.L.R.B. DUES REIMBURSEMENT REMEDY

orders based upon inferences of illegality, which inferences may be
overcome only by the inclusion of three reasonable, yet arbitrary
safeguards.
It requires no stretch of the imagination to see how the Board
found a violation in the Mountain Pacific situation in the light of the
objectives of the act. Clearly, the act would be circumvented if the
union was the exclusive source of labor and it was permitted to
discriminate against nonmembers in performing its hiring function.
Conditioning employment upon such an arrangement would clearly
be a return to the closed shop, which the Taft-Hartley amendments
sought to eliminate. In Mountain Pacific, the Board indicated that
it would no longer permit such statutory evasion; but in framing
its order, it failed to provide for any reimbursement. There was no
question as to the Board's power and discretion in fashioning
remedies for unfair labor practices; Virginia Electric and BrownOlds attested to this. Yet, with an express finding that the contract
encouraged membership in the union, (and as Broderick Wood
Products9' indicated, this inevitably coerced employees to pay dues),
the Board withheld the disgorgement remedy.
The absence of Brown-Olds in Mountain Pacific may have been
intentional or merely an oversight. But in either event, the Board
is certainly empowered to effect a change in its remedial policy.92
The Board may have felt that having evaluated the problems and
advantages inherent in applying Brown-Olds in exclusive hiring hall
situations, that Los Angeles was an appropriate vehicle for expressing
its policy. As the Board noted in Galveston Maritime, it has been in
the process of reappraising Brown-Olds, which process may have commenced immediately after Brown-Olds issued and which was not
ready for reaffirmation until Los Angeles.
However, even assuming that Los Angeles did have as its purpose
the establishment of Brown-Olds where only a contract exists as
evidence of unlawful encouragement, there is language in many of
the later cases which indicates a limitation of the remedy. The
remedy appears to be reserved for those situations in which the
contract or arrangement was enforced illegally with respect to the
91. NLRB v. Broderick Wood Prods., 118 N.L.R.B. 38, enforced, 261 F.2d
548 (10th Cir. 1958).
92. There is nothing, either in law or reason (if the two be mutually
exclusive), which binds a decision-making body to remain fettered by
stare decisis to the extent that it may never depart from precedent. As time
and conditions require modifications of present policy, such changes should
occur without demanding justification by legalistic circumlocutions. Indeed,
one may well ask why the Board waited ten years to depart from its ad hoc
basis of handling hiring hall problems. Yet, few would condemn the Board
for its delay (or abrupt departure, depending on the viewpoint taken)
merely because it has not given a satisfactory explanation, so long as the
results achieved are "just" and warranted.
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acquisition of employment, i.e., where the evidence indicates that
the employees who will benefit from the order were in fact encouraged to become members and were thereby coerced to pay dues
as a condition of obtaining employment. It is to be noted that in those
cases in which enforcement of the contract or arrangement was
stressed, the facts disclosed illegality in the union-security provisions
of the contract, and no Mountain Paciftc infirmities. Further, in
accordance with established Board reasoning, its broad cease and
desist orders were based on the mere existence of the illegal contract
and not on proof of actual discrimination or "enforcement"; however,
in fashioning its remedial orders, reimbursement was limited only to
those employees who were shown to have been coerced to pay dues
as a result of the enforcement of the contract. Thus it appears that
regardless of how effective an illegal contract may be in encouraging
membership, absent its enforcement, the evil is not great enough to
warrant a Brown-Olds remedy coextensive with the cease and desist
order.
And, as borne out by the later cases, a majority of the Board
would further restrict the remedy so that where the illegality arises
from an 8(a) (3) violative "union shop" provision, even if enforcement is present, the remedy will not obtain. While the distinction
between union-security and hiring hall cases has a degree of surface
appeal, insofar as the encouragement to become a union member
arises at the threshold of employment in the latter, it would seem
that if any justification exists for the imposition of a reimbursement
remedy, such justification should not be predicated on the basis of
when the employees were coerced to pay dues and fees but whether
they were required to pay at all. Whether an employee must pay
dues and fees to be referred to a job, or whether after the first week
of employment he must pay dues and fees to keep his job is immaterial; both exactions condition employment upon the payments
and both situations are therefore illegal. If any distinction is to
possess merit, it should be made along the lines of the quantum of
evidence necessary to support the finding of coercion in the first place.
And where the coercion is traceable to an illegal contract, the most
convenient guide might well be the extent to which the illegal contractual provisions were enforced.
It is to be noted, however, that in Nassau & Suffolk 93 the Board
said:
[T]he existence of an unlawful contract is sufficient in and of itself to
establish the element of coercion in the payment of monies by em93. Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs (the Nassau & Suffolk
case), 123 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1959).
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ployees pursuant to the requirements of such a contract. Accordingly,
the [Brown-Olds] remedy is applicable to all closed shop and exclusive
hiring hall agreements, which do not provide the safeguards set forth in
the MountainPacific decision.9 4

It can be seen that unquestionably the Board has taken what appears
to be a firm position-at least as regards the payment of dues and
fees to obtain employment-which requires only the showing of an
illegal contract. However, in view of the existence of the elements
of enforcement or practices in virtually all prior cases, plus the fact
that the Board expressly found that the contract was "enforced"
in the very same case in which the above language appeared, a
persuasive argument could be advanced that in the absence of proof
95
of contract enforcement Brown-Olds would be inappropriate.
This matter of "enforcement" is equally troublesome in determining the scope or coverage which the Board has given to the remedy.
It would seem that even where the unlawful encouragement to union
membership is predicated solely upon the existence of an unlawful
contract, the Board would order disgorgement to all employees
covered by the agreement. However, until Nassau & Suffolk, the
Board was limiting Brown-Olds only to the situs of employment
where the evidence disclosed that the contract was enforced.9 6 Thus
only those employees who might be deemed directly to have been
encouraged by an unlawful contract which was enforced benefited
from a Brown-Olds order.
The Board's decision in Nassau & Suffolk has not definitely put
to rest those situations in which enforcement of the contract has not
been demonstrated. It is fairly clear that at the present time the
Board will not consider an illegal union-security clause, which is
severable from lawful provisions or which is not enforced, as being
the type of infirmity which warrants imposition of a Brown-Olds
remedy.9 7 But the Board has yet to face another situation similar to
that encountered in Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, where the
illegality flows from a failure to conform a contract with the requirements of Mountain Pacific. In Nassau & Suffolk it may well be
that the Board was not considering the specific question of what
weight, if any, to accord to the evidence of enforcement in selecting
an appropriate remedial measure. Consequently, if the Board was
presented with a case in which the violation derives only from an
94. Id. at 1409.
95. See particularly the Board's decision in Frank Jaworski Sausage, supra
note 89, and the inescapable inference to be drawn from Harbur Terminal
Co., 126 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 45 L.R.R.M. 1362 (1960).
96. See, e.g., Tellepsen Constr. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 564 (1958).
97. Nordberg-Selah Fruit, Inc., supra note 86, and Frank Jaworski Sausage,
supranote 89.
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unenforced contract containing preferential or exclusive hire infirmities, the Board may well decide to create a third exception to the
Brown-Olds scheme. (The other two, it will be recalled, are premised
on the "technical" violation and the failure of "substantive allegation"
as expressed in Philadelphia Woodwork and E & B Brewing, respectively.)
If the underlying consideration behind Brown-Olds is deterring
respondents from conduct violative of the act, then wholesale application may best achieve the Board's desired ends.98 No doubt the
Board is aware of the impact and financial burden which BrownOlds places on respondents. This may well have been the underlying
consideration in Philadelphia Woodwork and E & B. It may also
account for the narrowing of Los Angeles, as the cases requiring
"enforcement" illustrate. And, if a contract illegal on its face is not
enforced (or as member Bean would say, "enforced only in a lawful manner"), what material harm is done? Of course, if employees
are prejudiced by illegal provisions, a remedy is appropriate. But
such prejudice should be proved not inferred.
Despite the fact that Nassau & Suffolk did not resolve "enforcement" problems, it did clarify the area within which liability would
attach. While the Board has necessarily been limiting the respondent's liability for reimbursement to a period beginning six months
prior to the filing and service of the original charge,99 it has extended
the coverage of the remedy so as to make a respondent's liability coextensive with its degree of participation in the administration of
the illegal contract. The Board has indicated that where the union
alone is named respondent, it will be liable for reimbursing all
employees of all employers for monies which the employees paid
pursuant to the unlawful agreement. When an employer alone is
named respondent, his liability will be limited to reimbursing all
of his employees for monies which they were coerced to pay to the
union. Where both an employer and union are named respondents,
their liability will be joint and several; but, while the union's liability
will extend to all employees of all employers who are covered by the
contract, the respondent employer's liability will be limited to reimbursing only his own employees. The rationale underlying this
apparently disparate treatment is that "an employer participates in
a contract only to the extent [his] own employees are involved,"
98. See United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing &
Pipefitting Indus. (the Lummus case), 125 N.L.R.B. 1161 (1959), where the
Board said: "[W]e believe that a mere cease and desist order will have
little impact on an industry where illegal hiring practices are widespread.
The reimbursement remedy more properly effectuates the purposes of the
Act because it provides not only a deterrent to future violations but an
incentive to future compliance." Id. at 1164.
99. Stanley Warner Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 45 L.R.R.M. 1318 (1960).
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whereas "a union which maintains contractual relations with one or
more employers participates to the full extent of the contract's
coverage."100
There is always a lag between administrative policy making and
its manifestation in administrative decision. Similarly, until an
aggrieved party or the administrative agency decides to take the
matter to the courts, substantial periods of time may elapse during
which periods the newly established policy often becomes firmly
embedded in administrative precedent. This is precisely the situation
in which the Board's handling of Brown-Olds has become enmeshed.
Yet, however firm the Board's views may be, the Board may be
forced to give way to the van of forceful judicial opinion. Of course,
until the Supreme Court speaks on the issue, the Board may disregard
the opinion of any particular circuit and continue to adhere to its
conceptual role as a creator of labor law. But, the cases have reached
that critical stage where the courts of appeals are taking their swings
and the decisions are being issued at a fast and furious rate.
As of July 12, 1960 (see Appendix II), the Cburts of Appeals for
the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and District of Columbia
Circuits have expressed opinion as to the appropriateness of BrownOlds. The First and Seventh Circuits are the only judicial bodies
which have expressly approved of the Board's choice of remedy; all
of the remaining circuit courts have denied enforcement of the
Brown-OZds remedial order.
The first decision to issue was a per curiam opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 101 The court set aside the
entire order of the Board on the ground that the record lacked substantial evidence to show that there existed an "exclusive" hiring
arrangement or that "the Union coerced Fluor's employees to join
[the union]."
In a subsequent per curiam opinion the court enforced the Board's
order modifying it only to the extent that the Brown-Olds order
"goes too far in directing reimbursement of the dues and fees paid
to the union by all casual employees."'102 The court noted the divergent opinions which, in the interim, had been expressed by the Third
and Seventh Circuits and was "constrained to the view that the
Third Circuit opinion more aptly applie[d]. . . ." The decision is
noteworthy from an aspect other than Brown-Olds; this was the first
100. Nassau & Suffolk, supra note 93 at 1409. See also News Syndicate,
supra note 83, and Local 363, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers (the Fluor case),
123 N.L.R.B. 1877 (1959).
101. International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 833 (D.C.
Cir. 1959).
102. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (the Los Angeles-Seattle Motor
Express case), 275 F.2d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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opinion which "appears to hold that an exclusive hiring-hall agreement is necessarily unlawful.' 10 3 It is to be recalled that the Board's
Mountain Paciftc decision, which set forth the three requirements for
the operation of an exclusive hiring hall arrangement, met a literally
104
stronger "mountain" in the ninth circuit.
The majority of the courts denying Brown-Olds enforcement in
one degree or another considered the order more penal than remedial.
Although recognizing their own limitations with respect to setting
aside or modifying Board orders when there is no showing "that the
order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which
can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act . . .,",10 the
courts almost unanimously indicated an unwillingness to enforce
Brown-Olds in the absence of evidence that employees were, in fact,
coerced to pay dues and fees. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit said:
To say, as we have said, that there was discrimination tending "to
encourage union membership" is not to say that the union members on
the job became members or retained their membership in the Union in
In the absence of some proof
order to secure or retain employment ....
that dues would have been paid but for the requirement, the Board's
order becomes punitive rather than compensatory.106
This expression clearly sets upon the Board's General Counsel the
burden of coming forward with evidence of the specific individuals
who were compelled to pay dues and fees in order to obtain and/or
retain employment. Thus, the courts are registering disapproval
of the Board's broad blanketing Brown-Olds order rather than disapproval of the basic restitutionary principle implicit therein.
Further evidence that the courts are not loath to enforce BrownOlds orders are the several recent decisions where the courts enforced
"reimbursement" orders to the specific individual discriminatees in
whose behalf proof of coercion had been introduced at the trial
stage and where such proof became part of the record which came
08
before the courts.10 7 Even in the two circuits (first and seventh' )
103. Id. at 651 (Edgerton, C. J., dissenting). He would not have found
the contract or individual discrimination violative of Mountain Pacific.
The clear inference from his opinion is the rejection of the per se illegality
upon which Mountain Pacific is premised.
104. Mountain Pacific Chapter of Associated General Contractors, 119
N.L.R.B. 883, enforcement denied, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959).
105. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953).
106. NLRB v. Local 85, Sheet Metal Workers (the Mahon Constr. Co. case),
274 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1960).
107. Teamsters, Local 357 (the Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express case),
supra note 102. In Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 276 F.2d 63 (9th Cir.
1960), the court, while denying enforcement of the broad disgorgement
order to all of the employees, enforced the trial examiner's recommended
order to limit reimbursement solely to the five student football players who
were denied summer employment because they were not members of the
union.
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which have upheld application of the Brown-Olds remedy, "there
was some evidence... that the contract had prevented the employment of nonmembers."'109
The Seventh Circuit's decision enforcing the broad Brown-OZds
order proceeded upon the ground that the contracts illegally conditioned employment upon union membership and that the burden of
coming forward rested on the respondents to show that the union
member-employees would have continued to maintain their membership in the union even without the unlawful provisions. The
respondents contended that when the contract was executed all of
the affected employees were already members of the union and
could not, as a consequence of the illegal contract, have been coerced
to pay dues and fees as a condition of employment. The court rejected this contention on the theory that although the agreements
did not require the employees to join the union, "they were, however, deprived of their right to resign." Then, so as not to be construed as dealing in abstrusities, the court reverted to time-proved
doctrine by stating: "The complex problem presented is broader than
the interests of the named litigants. The rights of an indeterminate
number of employees and of the public are involved."" 0
The Second Circuit was not impressed with the Seventh Circuit's
theory;"' nor were the other circuits which subsequently rendered
decision." 2 The courts were more concerned with the fact that in
many cases the evidence disclosed that the employees had been
members of the union for many years prior to the execution of the
illegal contracts and that to require the respondent employer and
union to reimburse all dues and fees for the six month period would
be "but a windfall to the employees and an unjust penalty to the
employer."" 3
One further penal aspect of the Brown-Olds remedy which was
recognized early in its genesis was the apparently inequitable burden
it placed upon employers who never retained any of the "tainted"
monies but, at most, served only as conduits between the employees'
108. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Carpenters, (the Clemenzi Constr. Co.
case), 278 F.2d 823 (1st Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Local 60, United Bhd. of
Carpenters (the Mechanical Handling Systems case), 273 F.2d 699 (7th Cir.
1960).
109. Building Materials Teamsters, Local 282 (the Crawford Clothes case),
275 F.2d 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1960).
110. 273 F.2d at 703.
111. 275 F.2d at 912.
112. See Appendix 1I. In Clemenzi Constr. Co., supra note 108, the first
circuit relied upon the seventh circuit's decision, but only in support of the
proposition that a reimbursement order is not, under all circumstances, improper.
113. NLRB v. American Dredging Co., 276 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1960), quoted
approvingly in Morrison-Knudsen, supra note 107.
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purses and the unions' coffers. 1 4 In its first decision dealing with
the matter, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:
This remedy would require the employers to pay back not only the
permit fees paid by nonunion workers and members of other locals, but
to reimburse long standing members . . . for dues paid by them ...
Reimbursement of these employees represents a windfall to them at
the expense of their employers.
Furthermore, even as applied to the members of other locals
and those men not members of any union, we think the remedy is unfair.
The order requires the employers, who at most received indirect
financial benefit from the unlawful practices, to pay back all of the
dues, permit fees, and initiation fees collected by the union local. At
the same time the primary beneficiary of the unlawful conduct and
undeniably the most culpable of the parties, Local 545, has been permitted to retain in its treasury the funds unlawfully exacted by it.115
The italicized language would lead even the most circumspect critic

to the conclusion that if the union had been a party-respondent in
the case the court might very well have enforced the disgorgement
order against it. But speculation is unnecessary for on the very same
day, the court issued its decision in Crawford Clothes" 6 where a
union was named as party respondent and the court denied enforcement. The case involved, inter alia, a contractual provision which
failed to accord the 30-day grace period required by the proviso to
section 8(a) (3) of the act. The court said:
We recognize also that requiring reimbursement by the union is less
oppressive than demanding it of the employer, since the union has at
least received the dues-although it has also rendered the services for
which the dues were paid. However, there is not a syllable of evidence
that in this case the omission of the 30-day clause in fact had any
coercive effect.117
Thus the Second Circuit, in line with the decided majority of courts
of appeals, has adopted the "evidence of coercion" test before any
respondent, employer or union, will be held liable for "reimbursing
the fruits of their unfair labor practices."
Perhaps the best summation of why the courts are inclined not to
enforce Brown-Olds orders appears in a recent Fifth Circuit opinion.
Although the alleged violation there involved section 8 (b) (4) of the
act, the language is apposite to the instant discussion:
There is nothing in the record to justify any such broad coverage.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See note 53 supra.
Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1960).
Note 109 supra.
275 F.2d at 912. (Emphasis added.)

...
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We are aware of the considerations supporting a broad grant of
discretion to the Board in determining the proper remedy for a violation
of the Act. We consider more important, and basic to a fair administration of the Act, the hard-won principle of Anglo-American law that
a judgment or order must find adequate support in the record. An
order of a court or federal agency that goes beyond the record to
penalize the offender smacks too much of attainder to be acceptable
to this court. We are committed to a narrower view of the proper scope
of orders that may furnish the basis for contempt proceedings." 8
With this failure of agreement among many judicial authorities as
to what shape the law should assume, it is fair to say that no clearly
predictable resolution of the Mountain Pacific and Brown-Olds problems is apparent. Each particular authority has marshalled its own
following and, in such matters, it is for the final arbiter to say
which viewpoint rests on the sounder base." 9
CONCLUSION
The Board is finding unlawful assistance when the employer
executes, maintains or enforces a contract which contains unlawful
union security provisions or which is unlawful because executed at
an inappropriate time. The Board is also finding unlawful assistance
when pursuant to a contract or practice the employees are coerced to
pay dues and various fees, under either an exclusive hiring arrangement which fails to conform to Mountain Pacific, or which, though
not exclusive, in one way or another, requires the employees to pay
these monies as the price to obtain employment. In such circumstances, the Board will order the respondents, jointly and severally,
to refund all dues, fees, and other monies unlawfully exacted to all

affected employees, whether or not an 8 (a) (2) violation is alleged.
In addition, whether the dues were collected pursuant to a check-off
provision or paid to the union directly by the employees will not
affect the order.
As regards union security and Mountain Pacific situations, a few
basic situations remain clear amid the glaze of interpretive language.
Where the union security provisions of a bargaining agreement were
violative merely because of a failure to comply with the filing requirements of sections 9 (f), (g) and (h) of the act, Brown-Olds was
not ordered. The Board contemplated a violation more flagrant than
that to warrant Brown-Olds. Perhaps this general view will find
expression in other contexts. Similarly, the Board insists upon an
118. NLRB v. Local 926, Operating Eng'rs (the Armco Drainage case), 267
F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir. 1959).
119. On June 27, 1960, the Supreme Court agreed to review two cases
involving the Brown-Olds remedy: NLRB v. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, both cited in Appendix II.
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allegation of a contract or hiring practice which is substantively unlawful. Whether this means a contract or practice which violates one
of the sections which defines unfair labor practices, or a practice
which is a more "flagrant" violation than that which is created by
only a contractual failure to conform to the criteria of Mountain
Pacific, is not entirely clear.
Apart from the above conditional applications, Brown-Olds will
be ordered where there exists an agreement which encourages membership in a union at the point where an employee seeks initial
employment, and such agreement is enforced by virtue of practices
pursuant to it. Even apart from a formal written contract, the
enforcement of an oral agreement or the existence of practices pursuant to some mutual arrangement between the employer and union,
will be sufficient justification for disgorgement. Further, under the
Board's Nassau & Suffolk decision, it would seem that even in the
absence of evidence of contract enforcement, Brown-Olds will be applied where a contract provides for closed shop or preferential hiring
conditions.
It would seem that where the unlawful encouragement to union
membership is predicated solely upon the existence of an unlawful
contract, the Board would order all employees covered by the contract reimbursed. However, until the Nassau & Suffolk decision,
the Board was limiting Brown-Olds only to the situs of employment
where the evidence disclosed that the contract was enforced. Thus,
only those employees who were actually shown to have been encouraged to become union members, and thereby coerced to pay dues
as a condition of employment, benefited from the reimbursement
order. Whether the absence of enforcement will affect the application
of Brown-Olds in future cases remains to be seen. The Board consistently has been extending the remedy to cover all employees at
all locations of a particular employer, however, where the facts indicate that the employer and union maintained unlawful hiring
conditions throughout the union's jurisdiction. At the same time, the
Board has been limiting the individual liability of the employer who
is a member of an employer association. While the employers and
union are held jointly and severally liable, each employer's liability
is limited to the reimbursement of monies paid by its employees to
the union.
The courts of appeals, however, are indicating that wholesale application of the Brown-Olds remedy will not be countenanced. The
First and Seventh Circuits have enforced the disgorgement order
but only upon facts which disclosed that some of the employees were
coerced. Even the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia
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and Ninth Circuits upheld a limited "reimbursement" remedy for
those employees shown to have been coerced. Conceivably, the
General Counsel might investigate the cases more fully to determine
the exact dates when union membership was acquired and conduct
polls among employees to see if they would give up union affiliation
and the payment of dues if such "free choice" were permitted without
impairing their opportunities for continued employment. 20 However, the Board has candidly stated that:
The Board has considered numerous cases involving contracts containing
exclusive hiring clauses and has held that the existence of such a contract . . . inevitably coerces employees to become or remain members

and to make payments to the union. We do not believe that testimony
by union members as to their motives for joining or remaining members
of the union is, in a context such as this, sufficiently persuasive to
warrant a different result here.121
In view of this expressed position, it is difficult indeed to imagine
in what other context employee motive, or any other evidence, would
be "sufficiently persuasive to warrant a different result."

APPENDIX I

Cases Lacking 8(a) (2) Aspects
Which Incorporate Brotvn-Olds Orders

T. C. Wagster, 122 N.L.R.B. 944 (1959).
Local 1566, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 122 N.L.R.B. 967 (1959).
Local 176, United Bhd. of Carpenters (the Dimeo Constr. Co. case), 122
N.L.R.B. 980 (1959).
Argo Steel Constr. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1959).
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 1147 (1959).
International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 (the Fluor Co. case), 122
N.L.R.B. 1374 (1959).
United States Steel Corp. (the American Bridge case), 122 N.L.R.B. 1324
(1959).
American Dredging Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 139 (1959).
Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Ltd., 123 N.L.R.B. 395 (1959).
Local 469, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (the Rasmussen case), 122 N.L.R.B. 674
(1958).
News Syndicate Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 818 (1959).
Saltsman Constr. Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1959).
Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs (the Nassau & Suffolk case), 123
N.L.R.B. 1393 (1959).
120. But cf. Lakeland Bus Lines v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1960),
where the court said: "It is claimed at argument that the union has never
collected any dues. Argument, of course, is not proof. But it does seem
to us that an inquiry into this situation might well have been made before
the very powerful Brown-Olds remedy was administered." Id. at 892.
121. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. (the Lummus Corp. case), 125 N.L.R.B. 1161 (1959).
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International Union of Operating Eng'rs (the Armco Drainage case), 123
N.L.R.B. 1833 (1959).
Local 363, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers (the Fluor Corp. case), 123 N.L.R.B.
1877 (1959).
Gay Eng'r Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 451 (1959).
United Bhd. of Carpenters (the H. K. Ferguson Co. case), 124 N.L.R.B. 544
(1959).
Bricklayers Union (the G. L. Rugo & Sons case), 124 N.L.R.B. 691 (1959).
Helben Chemical Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 872 (1959).
International Hod Carriers Union (the Consolidated Constr. Co. case), 124
N.L.R.B. 1131 (1959).
Local 215, United Bhd. of Carpenters (the Association Bldg. Contractors case),
125 N.L.R.B. 94 (1959).
Funeral Directors of Greater St. Louis, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 241 (1959).
International Hod Carriers Union (the Knowlton Constr. case), 125 N.L.R.B.
704 (1959).
United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefltting
Indus. (the Lummus Corp. case), 125 N.L.R.B. 1161 (1959).
Bordas & Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1959).
Local 1445, Int'l Hod Carriers (the Fenix & Scisson, Inc. case), 126 N.L.R.B.
No. 34, 45 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1960).
Local 244, The Motion Picture Operators Union (the Stanley Warner Corp.
case), 125 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 45 L.R.R.M. 1318 (1960).
Ingalls Steel Constr. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 45 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1960).
Local 401, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 126 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 45 L.R.R.M. 1388
(1960).
Anderson Express, Ltd., 126 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 45 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1960).
Local 466, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers (the Moore Electric Co. case),
126 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 45 L.R.R.M. 1406 (1960).
But see the following cases in which the Brown-Olds remedy was considered inappropriate:
Harbur Terminal Co., 126 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 45 L.R.R.M. 1362 (1960).
Nordberg-Selah Fruit, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 45 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1960).
Chun King Sales Co., 126 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 45 L.R.R.M. 1392 (1960).
Local 569, United Packinghouse Workers (the Frank Jaworski Sausage case),
126 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 45 L.R.R.M. 1394 (1960).

APPENDIX II
Court Decisions Involving Brown-Olds Orders
(Arranged Chronologically)

*

International Union of Operating Eng'rs (the Fluor Co. case), 273 F.2d
833 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
N.L.R.B. v. American Dredging Co., 276 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1960).
N.L.R.B. v. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters (the Mechanical

* This case and N.L.R.B. v. International Bhd. of Carpenters, infra, are
the only cases to date (June 30, 1960) in which the Board's Brown-Olds
orders have been enforced. However, as noted in the accompanying text, in
Local 60, there was some evidence of enforcement of the illegal contract;
this was also true with respect to Local 111. Therefore, the Board has thus
far been able to muster support for its remedy in only two circuits, the 1st
and 7th.
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Handling Systems case), 273 F.2d 699 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 363 U.S.
837 (1960).
N.L.R.B. v. Local 85, Sheet Metal Workers (the Mahon Constr. Co. case),
274 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1960).
Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (the Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express case), 275 F.2d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 363 U.S. 837.
Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. N.L.R.B., 276 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1960).
Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. N.L.R.B. 275 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1960).
Building Materials Teamsters (the Crawford Clothes, Inc. case), 275
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1960).
N.L.R.B. v. Local 176, Int'l Bhd. of Carpenters (the Dimeo Constr. Co.
case), 276 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1960).
** N.L.R.B. v. Local 294 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (the Grand Union Co. case),
279 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1960).
N.L.R.B. v. Millwrights' Local 2232 (the Farnsworth & Chambers case),
277 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1960).
N.L.R.B. v. United States Steel Corp. (the American Bridge case), 278
F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1960).
Lakeland Bus. Lines v. N.L.R.B., 278 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1960).
N.L.R.B. v. Local 1566, Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n (the Maritime Ship
Cleaning Co. case), 278 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1960).
*** N.L.R.B. v. Revere Metal Art Co., 280 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1960), petition
for rehearing denied per curiam.
N.L.R.B. v. Halben Chemical Co., 279 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1960).
* N.L.R.B. v. International Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 111 (the Clemenzi
Constr. Co. case), 278 F.2d 823 (1st Cir. 1960).
*** Paul M. O'Neill Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 280 F.2d 936
(3d Cir. 1960).
Puerto Rico S.S. Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 281 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
N.L.R.B. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs (the Armco Drainage case), 279 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1960).
N.L.R.B. v. Local 450, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs (the Tellepsen
Constr. Co. case), 281 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1960).
** On petition for rehearing, the court, on June 17, 1960 (46 LRRM 2492)
reversed its previous holding respecting the inappropriateness of the Board's
reimbursement order and granted enforcement in full. The thrust of the
decision, however, was not the presence of closed shop or illegal hiring
provisions but rather that the union represented only a minority of the
employees while it was receiving the check-off dues. This, the court felt, was
clear coercion. While this smacks of a typical 8(a) (2) rationale, and the
court upheld the Board's 8(a) (2) finding, the court did say that for
company domination, while it "may be an additional factor to support a
reimbursement order[:] . . . [it] is not, however, a necessary element."
* * * Both the Revere Metal Art and O'Neill cases are typical reimbursement
order cases applicable to 8(a) (2) violations which found support in the
record; both unions were company assisted and dues were collected under
their contracts.

